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Abstract  
Economic theory has provided an estimable intuition in understanding the perplexing ideologies in law, 
in the areas of economic law, tort law, contract law, procedural law and many others. Most legal 
systems require the parties involved in a legal dispute to exchange information through a process called 
discovery. The purpose is to reduce the relative optimisms developed by asymmetric information 
between the parties. Like a head or tail phenomenon in stochastic processes, uncertainty in the 
adjudication affects the decisions of the parties in a legal negotiation. This paper therefore applies the 
principles of aleatory analysis to determine how negotiations fail in the legal process, introduce the 
axiological concept of optimal transaction cost and formulates a numerical methodology based on 
backwards induction and stochastic options pricing economics in estimating the reasonable and fair 
bargain in order to induce settlements thereby increasing efficiency and reducing social costs.  
 
 
Formulation of Hypothesis and Research Design 
From Adam Smith’s comments on the economic influence on mercantilist legislation to the 20th 
Century R. Coase, G. Calabresi, through to the Chicago school and the contemporary philosophy 
of the economic interpretation of various aspects of the legal scholarship, we’ve seen how the 
mass elixir of economic and mathematical intuition has shed light on the legal philosophy and 
process both in academia and legal practice.  
Richard A. Posner shows the difference between utilitarianism and economics as many legal 
scholars at the time criticized the utilitarian philosophy of Economic Analysis of Law 1. He also 
shows that the economic norm of wealth maximization provides a substantial basis for a normative 
theory of law as opposed to shear utilitarianism, hence the system of wealth maximization 
transfers wealth to those who have productive assets in the form of time, goods, or skill. Those 
who have little or no productive assets have little or no claim on the assets of others hence little or 
no wealth is transferred to them2. Posner’s assertions provide a basis for understanding the value 
of exchange not only in the law but also in trade, that one needs to provide something in order to 
gain another in return.  
In a legal dispute, parties engage in a series of negotiations so as to resolve the issue without trial. 
The parties need to present a fair and reasonable bargain in order to induce the WTA (willingness 
to accept) of the plaintiff and the WTP(willingness to pay) of the defendant. Cooperation can only 
be attained when the WTA of the plaintiff is less than or equal to the WTP of the defendant. 
Professor Ronald H. Coase in his famous Coase Theorem posits that if there are no transaction 
costs parties in a dispute will reach an efficient outcome in the presence of externalities regardless 
of how property rights are allocated3. The law should be structured to minimize the impediments 
that hinder cooperation and when cooperation fails the the law should aim to minimize the harm 
caused by failures in private negotiations. Therefore the Normative Coase-Hobbes Theorem 
suggests that in order to reduce the harm caused by the failures in private agreements and to 
render transaction costs irrelevant , the law should allocate the right to the party which values it 
the most4. Hobbes’ original philosophy is presented in his work , Leviathan in 16515. 
Coming up with coherent models in transaction cost analysis has been very difficult, this paper 
however seeks to assert an optimal transaction cost theory that does not only shed light on Coase 
Theorem but also proposes a more applicable analysis of the transaction cost in the legal process 
6. 
Arnold likened the operation of the judicial system to a theatrical performance where the judges 
are actors from whose play lines moral lessons could be learned , the litigants who have sponsored 
the show are not welcome to the show because the principles of substantive law is constantly 
aimed at preventing or reducing the rate of litigation by referring the litigants to renegotiations , 
 
1 Even today many legal scholars still misconstrue the concepts of utilitarianism and wealth 
maximization in the analysis of law. See; Richard A. Posner, "Utilitarianism, Economics, and 
Legal Theory," The Journal of Legal Studies 8, no. 1 (Jan., 1979): 103-140 
2 Richard A. Posner , “The Ethical And Political Basis of The Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication,” 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487 1979-1980 
3 Ronald H. Coase , The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law and Econ. 1 (1960)  
4 Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1982)  
5 The original work by Thomas Hobbes in 1651 is regarded as one of the earliest and most 
influential examples of social contract theory , see;  
Hobbes, T. (1996). Hobbes: Leviathan: Revised student edition(Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Political Thought) (R.Tuck,Ed.).Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511808166  
6 Steven Tadelis and Oliver Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics,” University of California , 
Berkeley, November 14 , 2010 ,available online at;  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e4e8/a0486808360d056dbe212f7424273558538c.pdf 
arbitration or telling them to resort to the action of a commission7. The question Arnold was 
putting across was that if the play is not sponsored by the litigants then the audience will loose the 
opportunity to learn the moral lessons of the play. Meaning, the occurrence of trials produce 
precedent for resolving future cases, so if the law is structured so as to reduce the number of trials 
by inducing private agreements then less precedent might be created. 
Less precedent also means more uncertainty in the future judgments which will further induce 
more private cooperation especially with risk averse litigants. Nevertheless, when precedent is 
lacking, courts find it difficult to pass judgments that reflect with the social norms so injurers 
exercise less precaution thereby resulting in more trials. The focus of this paper however is not to 
propose a solution to this dilemma but to show how the uncertainty of judgment can influence the 
choices made by litigants in private agreements. 
There are three sections, Section 1 formulates a numerical instrumentation in analyzing the 
reasonable bargain under symmetric and asymmetric information, proposes the optimal 
transaction cost theory and discusses the effect of time on private agreements in the legal process.  
Section 2 devises a quantitative methodology in analyzing the factors that determine the 
axiological threshold in the bargain position of litigants and uses a probabilistic approach in 
estimating the ‘fair bargain’ under uncertainty of the outcome of judgment; a method formulated 
from stochastic options pricing economics. 
The last section, Section 3 then tests the fair bargain formularization through conceptual analysis 
of the legal process to highlight the application of the methods developed in this paper.   
 
 
 
 
Section 1: Game Theoretic Analysis of the Legal process 
There are conflicts between Posner’s “value of exchange” and Coase-Hobbes’ “allocation of rights 
to the party which values the most” , this is why we need a theory to draw us from the allocative 
paradigms to a more self-reliant approach. 
Litigants in a dispute as rational beings seek to maximize their benefits and reduce their losses as 
much as possible. This utility maximization (though not exactly utilitarianism) leads them to make 
decisions based on strategies in order to counter their opponent just as any other game within the 
purview of game theory.  
Prisoners’ dilemma is a famous game in which players are not allowed to communicate with each 
other, a perfect example of a game under asymmetric information. If the players could negotiate 
they would come up with a strategy that would maximize each players benefit. Fortunately, the 
legal process is just the opposite, litigants are taken through the discovery process and are 
encouraged to share information. Albeit the presence of discovery we still see trials taking place 
after negotiations, some cases just a few , others several negotiations still do not result in 
settlements. 
Information alone is not enough to induce private agreements, players in the game need a 
reasonable and fair bargain from the opponent to result in cooperation. In a 1994 lecture, Randal C. 
 
7 Arnold, Thurman W., "The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process" (1932). 
Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 4258, available online at;  
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4258 
Parker explained that even though players in a game could have dominant strategies a game could 
end up in a single or multiple Nash equilibria ; as a consequence, players would then use pure 
strategy, that is none of the players would be playing in a probabilistic fashion8. Under symmetric 
information litigants may devise other ways of playing the game even though they will be using 
pure strategies.  
 
See figure (1) below: 
 
8 For an extensive inquiry into how players in a game use pure strategies in equilibrium and the 
relationship between such games and the legal process see; Randal C. Picker, "An Introduction to 
Game Theory and the Law" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 22, 
1994) 
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Figure (1) 
  
 
 
Figure (1) represents the decisions and outcomes in a legal process; the defendant either causes 
injury to the plaintiff or no injury. If no injury game ends (injury here represents all kinds of harm 
including breach of contract ,tort and many others) . If there is an injury the plaintiff decides to file 
a suit or let it go for a payoff of zero. A suit results in either exchange of information through 
discovery process or outright settlement. There is a probability q for settlement with a payoff SB 
(let’s call it benefit of settlement), and a probability of 1-q when discovery results in a 
non-settlement, meaning negotiation is needed so the next stage is a bargain. From the bargain, 
there is still a probability q for the bargain to achieve settlement and 1-q when negotiation fails 
leading to a trial. The plaintiff has a probability p of winning and 1-p for losing the trial. WB is the 
payoff from winning at the trial, thus the judgment in favor of the plaintiff ( let’s call it winning 
benefit). If the plaintiff wins at trail, the defendant may appeal, likewise if the plaintiff loses she 
may go for an appeal that results in either win with a probability d and payoff WB, or lose with a 
probability 1-d and payoff zero. Either way the game ends because an appeal is to rectify the 
problems of the application of the law without further evidence or arguments being made. Also the 
outcome of the appeal isn’t dependent probabilistically on the strategies of the litigants. Ca and Cb 
are the administration costs (including court fees, trials, and any costs incurred during the trial 
process) and bargain costs (including negotiations, and all costs incurred during discovery and 
bargaining process) respectively. For simplicity of the model, we assume all administration costs 
are the same for all trials and all costs of bargain are the same for all negotiations and exchange of 
information. Moreover, this paper uses the American rule where each party bears their own 
litigation costs regardless of whether they win or lose.  
Expected values of each stage in the litigation process is deduced by backwards induction as 
follows; 
 
EVA , expected value of the appeal ;  
  →  EVA = (1-d)×0 + d(WB) - Ca                              (1)  
 
EVT, expected value of trial ;  
→  EVT = (1-p)×0 + p(WB) - Ca                    (2) 
 
EVB, expected value of bargain ;  
  →  EVB = (1-q)×(EVT) + q(SB) - Cb                 (3)  
 
EVC, expected value of claim ;  
  →  EVC = (1-q)×(EVB) + q(SB) - Cb                  (4) 
   
 
 
substituting equation (2) into (3) , we have ; 
 
EVB = (1-q)[ pWB - Ca] + qSB - Cb                 (5) 
  
substituting equation (5) into (4) , we have ; 
 
EVC = (1-q)[ (1-q)[ pWB - Ca] + qSB - Cb] + qSB - Cb 
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The threat value in a game is the payoff to a player in noncooperation. Legal scholars prefer the 
term ‘go-it-alone value’ due to the pugnacious nature of the word ‘threat’ especially when used in 
courts. In a legal bargain, the threat value, let’s denote as TP is at least as much as the expected 
value of the claim which is at least equal to the cost of filing the claim ,FC.  
Thus; 
TP ≥ EVC ≥ FC 
According to economic efficiency a rational litigant will only file a legal claim when the cost of 
filing a claim is at least equal to the expected value of claim. 
 
Hence we can deduce that for a minimum threat value, 
 TP=EVC ; 
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Section 1.1 : Reasonable Bargain in a Legal Negotiation 
Let’s take BN as the noncooperative bargain, thus threat value under no chance of settlement, q = 
0 , from equation (7) we have ; 
    baBN CCpWB 2−−=                             (8) 
 Equation (8) shows us that when there is no chance for settlement the threat value is dependent 
on the probability of winning the trial and the expected value of the judgment minus a function of 
the costs involved. When the exchange of material information isn’t effective the relative 
optimism is increased which results in trials. Albeit more costs involved in going for trial, the 
litigants are willing to sacrifice more Ca and Cb for a probabilistic reward of WB . 
Now, let’s go back to equation (7) and make q = 1 . When private agreement is estimated to be 
certain the cooperative bargain (let’s denote BC) is dependent on the settlement benefit, SB . Thus ;  
BC = WB(p×0) - Ca(0) + SB(2-1) - Cb(2-1)  
             BC = SB - Cb                             (9)   
However, even though the relative optimism is reduced and the plaintiff only bases her bargain on 
the settlement benefit offered by the defendant there is still a cost of Cb (bargaining cost). 
A reasonable bargain is the threat value plus the cooperative surplus shared equally between the  
parties. Note that the cooperative bargain here is a function of the threat value under which 
cooperation is possible, meaning this bargain position is certain to induce cooperation. 
Non-cooperative bargain position is certain to induce non-settlement.   
Cooperative surplus in this regard is the difference between noncooperative position and 
cooperative position . 
Thus; 
baBB
bBbaB
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BC is the payoff from the claim by the plaintiff through outright settlement, BN is the payoff from 
the claim by the plaintiff for no settlement. So the reasonable bargain is in between the two 
positions, thus the defendant needs to move up by the amount 
2
CN BB −  , while the plaintiff 
needs to move down by the same amount.   
 
Therefore, the reasonable bargain, RB can be calculated as ; 
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It is seen from equation (11) that the reasonable bargain amount is the average of the expected 
judgment from the trial and the payoff from settlement minus a function of the transaction costs. 
This shows that the higher the transaction costs the lower the reasonable bargain, hence higher 
transaction costs reduce the amount of the reasonable bargain thereby inducing private agreement , 
as opposed to Coase’s no transaction cost theorem. A possible explanation is that when parties in a 
legal dispute anticipate the ex ante costs vis a vis the ex post benefit , the may rather choose the 
option which is more present and probable with lower benefit than to take the risk of bearing 
higher costs in hopes of gaining a probabilistic higher benefit. Risk lovers nevertheless will like to 
undertake a venturesome undertaking with a higher reward (further research is needed in 
behavioral economics to address the possible explanations in this issue). 
Too much transaction costs on the other hand may deter the litigants from engaging in 
negotiations. This paper asserts that an optimum transaction cost needs to be attained in order to 
encourage cooperation. Section 1.2 demonstrates how optimal transaction cost is more efficient in 
inducing cooperation in a legal process. 
 
 
Section 1.2 : Optimal Transaction Cost 
From equation (11) , 
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This implies the RB is maximum under zero transaction cost and is totally dependent on the 
expected judgment and settlement benefit. Meaning, the absence of or very low transaction cost 
makes it easy for litigants to engage in several or prolonged legal disputes without having to worry 
about any costs. Thus inefficient in economic terms.  
 
 
when the expression    BBba SpWCC ++
2
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1
  , 
RB is zero or negative  
 
 
A reasonable litigant wouldn’t engage at all in a bargain where transaction costs are so high that 
there isn’t any room for making a reasonable bargain.  
 
Since most trial fees and attorney costs do not change rapidly , there is less volatility in the 
administrative costs , we can assume Ca as a constant (at least in a relatively not very long period). 
The probability of winning at trial doesn’t correlate with Cb , so we can assume Cb as a constant as 
well (the SB however, may change with time during a legal process due to possible psychological 
factors not to be discussed in this paper).   
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As shown in figure (2) above , when LC = PC , RB = 0 . When LC = 0 , RB = PC .  
If we move LC0 on the LC-axis to LC’ we get RB’ on the RB-axis . Meaning a small decrease in LC 
results in small increase in RB . LC’’ corresponds with RB’’ which is too high and unattractive to the 
opponent in the negotiation. This implies very high transaction cost also causes failure in private 
agreements in accordance with Professor Coase’s assertions. However , at point ‘a’ the budget line 
is tangent to the indifference curve ; there , LC* corresponds with RB* showing the optimal 
transaction cost and the reasonable bargain of a legal negotiation.  
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Inferring from figure (3) above ; when RB is held constant at RB0 and LC0 is reduced to LC’ , 
transaction cost is reduced but expected benefit is unchanged; the utility of the new combination is  
U1 which is clearly different from U0 and obviously lower (figure 3.1) . Also, when LC is held 
constant at LC0 and RB is moved from RB0 to RB’ , utility changes to U2 which is also different 
from and lower than U0 (figure 3.2) . Furthermore, when RB is held at RB0 and LC is moved 
drastically to LC’’ , utility is again changed to U3 (figure 3.3) .  
The analysis shows that the optimal transaction cost is at LC* with the highest utility , hence 
optimum transaction cost is more efficient than no or high transaction cost in estimating a 
reasonable bargain during a negotiation thereby inducing private agreements in a legal dispute. 
 
In addition, we see that as  bbC CCL 3
2
1
+=
, 
 
Any combination of Ca and Cb should result in the same optimal transaction cost, LC* . This paper 
recommends that courts should adjust administrative costs so that as Ca increases Cb decreases ; a 
lower Cb (bargaining cost) will induce cooperation in accordance with Coase Theorem while 
higher Ca prevents the litigants from going to trial. Further study is needed in determining how the 
courts could adjust the Ca such that injurers (as in offenders) will not exercise less precaution 
because they think higher administrative costs will prevent victims from filing legal suits plus 
going to trial .
 
 
 
Section 1.3 : Effect of Symmetric Information on a Legal Dispute 
Under symmetric information, the courts’ decision is unpredictable by either party because the 
probability of the outcome of the judgment doesn’t depend on the probabilistic strategies of the 
litigants. Litigants are therefore left with pure strategies to play, single or multiple Nash equilibria 
may be reached. 
The coefficient of the winning benefit is deterministic under symmetric information, thence the 
reasonable bargain is deterministic as well. Perfect information is essential in negotiations for 
correcting false optimism thereby inducing private agreements. 
A lower p in equation (11) causes the plaintiff to consider settlement.  
 
we can see that when p = 0 ,    baBB CCSR 3
2
1
2
1
+−=
            
  
Meaning, the value of the claim to the plaintiff, RB is lower than the value to the defendant’s offer, 
SB . Cooperation is easily induced. Thus, the voluntary exchange of information causes settlement 
by correcting false optimism. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s 1979 research shows that 
when there is uncertainty about the future people may rather choose the option in the present than 
the chance to a bigger reward in the future due to loss aversion9. Robert Cooter and Daniel 
 
9 The theory states that people make decisions based on the potential value of losses 
and gains rather than the final outcome. Daniel Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economics for his work developing prospect theory. See; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Rubinfeld have demonstrated how the efforts of litigants affect the probability of going to 
trial ,also, how the strategy of one party is influenced by change in the strategy of the other party 
10. 
When p = 1 in equation (11) we find that RB is dependent on the average of WB and SB minus a 
function of the transaction cost. Even though RB may be high , it is still better than BN because BN 
is dependant directly on the WB . Albeit , RB through the rigorous calculations has been shown to 
be a reasonable bargain and can induce cooperation , p = 1 might wreck any hopes of negotiations 
as shown in ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’ by Cooter et al11.  
 
Section 1.4 : Effect of Time on Negotiations in a Legal Dispute 
Parties involved in a legal dispute stand a chance of losing economically when the legal process 
takes too much time. Time spent on negotiations, discovery and trials can be used for other 
productive purposes. Opportunity cost increases with respect to time spent in litigant.  
Psychological issues, family , job , lack of finances and many others may impede the legal process 
or may frustrate the relative optimisms of the litigants. This paper posits that the tedious and 
costly nature of the legal process encourages earlier settlement and thus reduces the time used in 
litigation. When litigants weigh the time-value of their opportunity costs they may either reduce 
their bargain positions and opt for settlement or continue with the dispute if opportunity cost is 
less than the expected benefit from the dispute (further research is needed in determining 
quantitatively the effect of time-valued opportunity cost on the threat values and reasonable 
bargains of the parties in a legal dispute) .  
 
 
 
Section 2 : Axiological Evaluation of the Fair Bargain in The Legal Process  
In the previous section it’s been shown that under asymmetric information , the relative optimisms 
of litigants cause a wreck in negotiations hence the probability of settlement is reduced. The 
exchange of information corrects false optimism thereby inducing cooperation. Optimal 
transaction cost is more efficient in encouraging cooperation than no or high transaction cost. 
Administrative costs can be adjusted in combination with bargaining costs to formulate an optimal 
transaction cost which can influence the bargain positions of the litigants to encourage private 
agreements.  
This section seeks to devise a quantitative methodology in analyzing the factors that determine the 
axiological threshold in the bargain position of litigants. As the previous section deduced a method 
of estimating the reasonable bargain under both symmetric and asymmetric information, this 
section uses a probabilistic approach in estimating the ‘fair bargain’ under uncertainty of the 
outcome of judgment; a method formulated from stochastic options pricing induction. 
 
 
 
 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)  
10 Cooter, Robert, & Daniel Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their 
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989)   
11 This ideology is the overview of the context in the same paper by Cooter et al in the footnote 10 
above. 
 Section 2.1 : Describing the Legal Process as an Aleatory Process in Game Theory 
Looking at figure (4) below ; there is a bargain at the decision node D which may result in 
non-settlement or settlement. A settlement with probability q and payoff SB to the plaintiff , 
non-settlement results in either trial, T0 with probability 1-q or negotiation at node P0 with 
probability q . If there is a trial, there is probability of p winning with payoff WB and 1-p losing 
with payoff zero. The loser might go for an appeal which doesn’t have any probabilistic effect on 
the initial trial. At the node P0 the parties engage in renegotiation where there is a probability of q 
to go into another renegotiation or 1-q to go to trial, T1 . This palaverous conundrum could go on 
and on until node Pn . Interactions at Pn could result in another trial Tn or another renegotiation 
Pn+1 .  
  
trial or renegotiation trial (1-q)
trial or renegotiation trial (1-q)
negotiation q
trial or renegotiation trial (1-q)
EVP don’t settle 1-q
bargain settle (q) SB
Pn+1
P1
D
Pn
P0
WB
Tn 0
WB
T1 0
WB
T0 0
 
  
Figure (4) 
 
 
 
The mathematical theory of Brownian Motion has been used in analyzing the haphazard 
movement of particles in a fluid and has also been applied to stock market financial asset pricing, 
options pricing and so forth12. We can infer from figure (4) that the probabilistic outcomes of the 
negotiations and trial process exhibit characteristics of Brownian motion in the sense that ;  
 
1) the direction of the outcomes at the P nodes shows a stochastic process, just like a fair coin, 
under the assumption that the legal process is not biased . 
2) the aleatory nature of the legal process represents a function which maps the outcomes of an 
unpredictable process, although some legal cases do not have numerical variables we can estimate 
their axiological appraisals in economic analysis . Also, the trajectories as similar as shown in 
figure (4) . 
3) the probability of the outcomes at each stage is the same as the previous stages, if the legal 
process is not biased .  
 
A stochastic process is said to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion if it satisfies the equation 
( )ttt dBdtSdS  +=   
where μ is the percentage drift and σ is the percentage volatility.  
The equation used in options pricing is 
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Options are contracts between two parties in which one party has the right but not the obligation to 
do something, usually to buy or sell some underlying asset. In the legal process a plaintiff has the 
right but not the obligation to pursue a legal claim. A legal claim can be economically expressed as 
an asset.  
For an exercise price K, at date T, a plaintiff has the right stock price and sell it at ST on the market 
(in this case a legal dispute) . If ST > K then the plaintiff (owner of the option) will obtain a payoff 
of C at time T .  
→       C = (ST - K)+ = max(ST - K,0) 
If ST ≤ K the owner of a legal claim (the plaintiff) will not exercise her option and the payoff is 
zero. In a legal process, the main goal is to reduce loss as much as possible and if there is a gain 
on top of restitution the plaintiff deems it extra profit. Options’ main goal is to gain as much profit 
as possible while hedging against risk. ST = K is meaningless to an options dealer and is the 
minimum requirement for a legal claim. ST < K however, is considered a loss in legal claims.  
We need to ask the question of how much a defendant is willing to pay for such a claim. This 
 
12 Brownian motion is named after the botanist Robert Brown, who first described the 
phenomenon in 1827, while looking through a microscope at pollen of the plant Clarkia 
pulchella immersed in water,and has since then been developed and applied in various areas such 
as economics, physics, mathematics, and many more. See; Ermogenous, Angeliki, "Brownian 
Motion and Its Applications In The Stock Market" (2006), Undergraduate Mathematics Day, 
Electronic Proceedings , Paper 15 , available online at;  
http://ecommons.udayton.edu/mth_epumd/15 
paper develops the Fair Bargain theory using the Black-Scholes-Merton options pricing model to 
analyse the legal process. The model uses stochastic analysis to estimate the value for the price of 
options.  
Black-Scholes-Merton model is formulated on the following assumptions ( and are characteristic 
of the legal process ) :  
1) European exercise terms are used such that options can only be exercised on the expiration date 
T . The American exercise terms allow options to be exercised at any time during the life of the 
option. In the legal process the time involved is hypothetically likened to the exercise time of an 
option. One could say that the plaintiff can accept the offer given by the defendant at any time so 
the legal process follows the American exercise terms. We should note that Black-Scholes works 
well for American options when interest rates and dividends are low. Also, Maria et al develops a 
model that generalizes the well-known Leland model with constant transaction cost function, 
nonlinear volatility in pricing13. American style options by the Black-Scholes equation, a method 
of free boundary problem in pricing.  
At time  Tt ,0  prior to the maturity time T, an American call option paying continuous 
dividend yield q > 0 leads to a free boundary problem. 
- if Sf(t) >S for  Tt ,0  then V(t,S)>(S-K)+ 
- if Sf(t) ≤S for  Tt ,0  then V(t,S)=(S-K)+  
Maria et al shows that from Kwok’s work the free boundary problem for pricing American options 
consist in the formulation of a function V(t,S) and the early exercise boundary function Sf in 
relation V in the Black-Scholes equation on a time depending domain shown as follows14; 
{(t,S),0<S<Sf(t)} and V(t,Sf(t))=Sf(t)-E and ∂V(t,Sf(t))=1 . 
One could also argue that the bargain can only be reached at the end of the negotiation and 
whichever stage the litigation ends in the legal process is the exercise time of the option. 
Whichever way we argue, the Black-Scholes model applies since the legal process deals with 
relatively low rates and no dividends paid during the process .  
 
2) The stock pays no dividends in the period of the option, this is very characteristic of the legal 
process. Payment is only made after a negotiation is attained. 
 
3) Interest rates are constant and known. This paper posits that parties in a legal dispute should 
take into consideration the inflation rate of the general economy as the interest rate of the legal 
claim because with time the value of the legal claim is affected by the inflation rate. Remember, 
the main aim of the legal dispute is to restore the plaintiff to her original utility (through restitution, 
expectation damages or others depending on the situation), so the time-value of the claim needs to 
be taken into consideration. 
 
13 Black-Scholes formula is not generally applied to American call options because American 
options can be exercised before the expiration date, Maria et al attemps to develop an applicable 
model for the American options. See; Maria do Rosario Grossinho, Yaser Faghan Kord, Daniel 
Sevcovic,June 14, 2018,Pricing American Call Options by the Black-Scholes Equation with a 
Nonlinear Volatility Function , available online at; https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.00358  
14 Kwok, Y. K.: Mathematical Models of Financial Derivatives. Springer-Verlag, 1998  
 4) Market is efficient and there is no arbitrage. A legal dispute is assumed to be free and fair and 
outcomes cannot be predicted. The practice of taking advantage of a state of imbalance between 
two markets isn’t applicable in the legal process. A plaintiff can only deal with the defendant for a 
particular dispute. Also, there are usually a few players in the market of optimism pricing in legal 
terms. In case of Mary Carter Agreement where some defendants settle by accepting a term of 
which is a loan by the settling defendant to the plaintiff, to be repaid by any monies recovered 
from the remaining defendant(s), all parties are obliged to disclose Mary Carter Agreements 
immediately and the non-disclosure constitute abuse of the legal process. The legal system is 
therefore assumed to be efficient in the following analysis. 
 
5) No commissions are charged. It has been shown earlier in this paper that the reasonable bargain 
RB has already accounted for transaction costs, so if used in the Black-Scholes model there 
wouldn’t be a need to include the transaction costs; thus a function of the administrative costs 
(court fees , trials , legal fees and many others) and bargaining costs (negotiation costs, settlement 
costs and many others) . Since the transaction costs have been included in the bargain no 
commissions are charged in the subsequent calculations. 
 
6) Returns on a portfolio are normally distributed for most assets that offer options. 
 
Black-Scholes-Merton model for options pricing is stated as 15; 
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C = call option , S = underlying stick price , K = strike price , r = risk-free interest rate , T = time 
to maturity,  N is a cumulative standard normal distribution   
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In the legal process, from figures (1) and (4) and equation (11) the strike price of the claim is the 
reasonable bargain indicated RB . The underlying stock price is the expected value of payoff from 
the litigation, say EVP .  
 
 
15 See this paper for more information about the concept and formularization of the Black-Scholes 
equation also known as the Black-Scholes-Merton model; Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, "The 
Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy 81, no. 3 (May - Jun., 
1973): 637-654 , available online at; https://doi.org/10.1086/260062   
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The pattern goes on and on until E(Pn) , thus  
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From the Newton-Raphson method16;  
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Cauchy’s functional equation17 results in; 
            ( )
( )
( )





−=+
n
n
nn
PE
PE
EPEPE )( 1          (18) 
Divide equation (18) by E(Pn) we get; 
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Divide equation (17) by E(Pn) ; 
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see; Ben-Israel, Adi. (1965). A Newton-Raphson method for the solution of systems of equations. 
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications. 3. 94-98. 10.1007/BF02760034  
17 Hengkrawit, Charinthip & Laohakosol, Vichian & Pianskool, Sajee. (2006). Cauchy's functional 
equation in restricted complex domains. International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical 
Sciences. 2006. 10.1155/IJMMS/2006/69368   
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Substitute equation (19) into (20) we get; 
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Now, let’s invert the inner variables of 
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From differentiation of logarithm principle, 
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Substitute equation (22) into (21) ;  
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The expression dPn which is a small change in Pn is minute. That makes the expression 
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 
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 very small comparatively. Even though change in the value of the expected 
payoff is small, it increases as n increases (thus as the number of negotiations and interactions 
increases) . So we can say the expression 
( )
 
)(ln1 PnEd
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dP
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 is smallest at P0 , n=0 . P0 approaches 
pWB as n approaches infinity . q is also a fraction such that q≠1, if q=1 then cooperation will be 
assured, settlement will be induced at the node D and there wouldn’t be P0 at all; the game ends 
right there. In fact, this formula is formulated to solve disputes anticipated to go through a 
litigation process so q is generally small when litigation sets off, thence the product of 
( )q
q
−1
 and 
 
)(ln PnEd
n
dP
E  is a very minute number.  
 
         Therefore, E(P0) ≈ pWB                   (23) 
 
Substitute equation (23) into (14) we have; 
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Again, we can obviously infer from equation (24) that when q = 0 , EVP = pWB so a game is 
played ,the expected value of payoff from the litigation is directly dependent on the expected 
payoff from trial WB(winning benefit) and the probability of winning p, the litigation process sets 
off .  
When q = 1 , EVP = SB ,that’s settlement at the node D which is same as the offer from the 
defendant so no bargain is needed; the WTA of the plaintiff is equal to WTP of the defendant, no 
game is played.  
 
 
Section 2.2 : Fair Bargain Formularization via Stochastic Options Pricing Induction 
Now , we have ; 
Underlying stock price = EVP 
Strike price = RB 
Interest rate → inflation rate = i 
Time of exercise = T 
Standard deviation = σ (more research is needed to develop the methodology of estimating the 
standard deviation in this context instrumentally) 
 The (options) claim Q in a legal process can be formulated in Black-Scholes formula as follows; 
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{All variables expressed in aggregate terms as opposed to values per share in financial options} 
 
The Fair Bargain,FB in a legal dispute can therefore be estimated as  
FB = RB + Q 
 
This paper proposes the fair bargain as an effective bargaining position of inducing the WTA and 
WTP of the opponents in litigation. 
Coleman et al compares the utilities of the different players in a bargain and how uncertainty 
affects their strategies, the paper18 however, doesn’t provide an axiological estimation of how the 
bargain positions (price) can induce cooperation. Cooperation is feasible from RB to FB . The 
strength of the feasibility of cooperation is highest at FB after which cooperation becomes more 
and more difficult and the dispute gets closer and closer to trial.     
 
 
 
Section 3: Hypothesis Testing and Application 
Suppose in a legal issue, the plaintiff files for a claim of $10000. The defendant offers a settlement 
of $5000. The probability of the plaintiff winning the case at trial is 0.6 , and the probability of 
having a successful negotiation is 0.4 . Administrative costs for trial is $1000 while costs involved 
in the bargaining process and settlement is $500. Inflation rate of the country of adjudication is 
1.9% . It is anticipated that litigation would take 4 months to reach a straight out culmination. 
With an assumed standard deviation of 25% , we can estimate the fair bargain as follows ;  
SB = $5000 , WB = $10000 ,  
Ca = $1000 , Cb = $500 
p = 0.6 , q = 0.4 , 
i = 1.9% = 0.019 , σ = 25% = 0.25  
 
18 See; Coleman, Jules L., "A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default and Disclosure Provisions 
in Contract Law" (1989). Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 4195, available online at; 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4195/  
T = 4 months = (4/12) months = 0.3333 years 
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From the cumulative Normal Distribution Table19; 
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 The claim Q is given as ; 
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Therefore the Fair Bargain ,  
FB = $4250 + $1385.23 ≈ $5635 
                
 
19 The cumulative Normal Distribution Table shows values of d (as in d1 and d2) and their 
corresponding values of N. It can be downloaded from the University of Calgary, Department of 
Mathematics and Statistics Files, available online at; 
https://math.ucalgary.ca/files/math/normal_cdf.pdf  
Since the defendant offered $5000 as the settlement offer, $5635 is a fair bargain from the plaintiff 
because if negotiation fails, both parties will spend extra transactions costs of $1000 each for trial 
and $500 each for further negotiations. The reasonable bargain was $4250 , lower than the 
settlement offer, cooperation is feasible from $4250 to $5635.  
Conceptual analysis of options pricing provides a wide insight into the nature of the legal process 
and an axiological intuition for instrumentalization of the legal process as well as procedural law. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Uncertainty in the judgment, transaction costs, relative optimism, reasonable bargain affect private 
agreements and trials. When information is asymmetric, the relative optimisms of litigants cause a 
disruption in negotiations, the probability of reaching settlements is reduced, thence voluntary 
exchange of information not only induces private agreements but also increases efficiency in the 
legal process just as the undertaking of trading stocks based on non-insider information increases 
market efficiency. 
Additionally, it is asserted in this paper that optimal transaction cost is more efficient than no or 
high transaction cost; and a numerical methodology is proposed on how to estimate an optimal 
transaction cost in a legal process. via backwards induction analysis this paper demonstrates the 
decision making process and probabilistic outcomes of the legal process in game theory and 
devises a method for estimating the reasonable bargain to induce the WTA(willingness to accept) 
of the plaintiff and WTP(willingness to pay) of the defendant in a negotiation. 
Game theory mechanism per stochastic options pricing methodology is applied in the formulation 
of a conceptual analysis of the game played by the litigants and to estimate a ‘fair’ bargain in a 
negotiation. The above mentioned mechanism provides a wider insight into the nature of the legal 
process both axiologically and instrumentally. 
 
